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1	
1 Introduction		In	2007,	European	Union	economies	seemed	to	perform	rather	well	with	their	positive	economic	growth	and	low	inflation	levels.	Although	public	debt	was	quite	high,	it	appeared	to	be	feasible	assuming	a	positive	trend	in	economic	growth	would	continue.	This	was	until	the	global	financial	crisis	swept	across	the	continent	and	left	the	economic	environment	unsettled.	Southern	Europe1	(Portugal,	Italy,	Greece	and	Spain,	with	the	addition	of	Ireland)	suffered	the	most.	Their	increasingly	unsustainable	debt	level	and	approaching	solvency	issues	combined	with	strong	evidence	on	substantial	disparities	within	the	European	Monetary	Union	(EMU)	have	been	widely	debated	lately	(Roubini	and	Mihm,	2011).	Although	there	were	several	aspects	contributing	to	the	European	sovereign	debt	crisis,	macroeconomic	imbalances	have	been	claimed	to	be	at	root	of	the	problem.	Macroeconomic	imbalance,	as	defined	by	the	EU	Regulation	No	1176/2011	of	the	on	the	prevention	and	correction	of	macroeconomic	imbalances,	is	“any	trend	giving	rise	to	
macroeconomic	developments	which	are	adversely	affecting,	or	have	the	potential	adversely	
to	affect,	the	proper	functioning	of	the	economy	of	a	Member	State	or	of	the	Economic	and	
Monetary	Union”	(Council	of	the	European	Union,	2011).			Despite	the	research	that	has	been	conducted	on	the	topic,	there	still	seems	to	be	a	lack	of	consensus	on	whether	this	core-periphery	dualism	was	cultivated	by	the	aggregation	of	European	economic	integration	or	if	it	was	prevailing	condition	prior	to	the	common	currency	(Caporale	et	al,	2015).	Several	economists	have	presented	quite	differing	views	on	the	development	of	macroeconomic	divergence	and	most	of	the	research	conducted	has	mainly	focused	on	global	imbalances.	Unfortunately,	these	studies	often	overlook	the	immense	integral	economic	imbalances	and	the	loss	of	competitiveness	the	EMU	has	suffered	for	over	a	decade.		Sinn	and	Valentinyi	(2013)	address	the	issue	and	point	out	that	the	significant	increases	in	current	account	deficits,	which	from	an	economic	standpoint	cannot	be	sustained	for	indefinitely.	Since	the	imbalances	have	played	an	essential	role	in	the	development	and	outbreak	of	the	financial	crisis,	it	is	vital	that	the	issue	is	addressed.		
																																								 																					1	Southern	Europe,	semi-periphery	and	PIIGS	are	used	synonymously	in	this	paper	for	the	sake	of	convenience	despite	geographical	inaccuracy.	Similarly,	core	countries	are	sometimes	referred	as	Northern	Europe.		
	 2	As	the	global	demand	shattered	and	uncertainty	forced	firms	to	defer	investments,	the	problems	faced	by	the	semi-periphery	extended	also	to	the	export-oriented	core	countries	such	as	Finland	and	Germany.	This	has	been	largely	thought	to	be	due	to	the	EMU	Member	States	(MS)	contrasting	development	and	growth	patterns	in	the	early	2000’s	(Priewe,	2011).	Not	only	did	these	prompt	the	substantial	current	account	deficits	and	surpluses	across	MS,	they	contributed	to	house	prices	(i.e.	Spain’s	housing	bubble)	and	structural	sides	in	the	secondary	sector.	Since	these	changes	were	unsustainable	in	the	long-term,	many	regions	became	highly	susceptible	to	asymmetric	shocks	and	the	crises	that	would	follow.	There	have	also	been	indications	that	the	imbalances	are	the	reason	behind	Euro	Area’s	(EA)	lethargic	recovery	from	the	crisis,	and	these	have	highlighted	the	flaws	in	intra-EU	governance.	Hence,	macroeconomic	divergence	is	now	largely	seen	as	a	threat	for	the	security,	sustainability	and	cohesion	of	the	monetary	union.		In	spite	of	various	similarities	between	the	EMU	and	US	deficits,	the	imbalances	in	the	Eurozone	(EZ)	have	been	more	volatile,	leaving	the	EMU	on	the	verge	of	disintegration.	Albeit	this	has	often	been	seen	as	a	PIIGS	issue	of	profligacy	with	national	budgets,	it	is	a	fundamental	defect	in	the	composition	of	EMU.	Despite	Ireland	and	Spain’s	great	efforts	to	address	their	economic	issues	and	return	to	the	path	of	growth,	there	is	still	obscurity	surrounding	the	origins	and	development	of	the	imbalances	that	lead	to	debt	crisis		(Spratt	and	Goodman,	2017).	Various	hypotheses	have	been	devised	in	hopes	of	resolving	the	issue,	yet	there	have	been	no	conclusive	reporting	done	on	the	subject	matter.	Since	this	has	been	such	a	central	aspect	of	the	current	sovereign	debt	crisis,	this	paper	attempts	to	understand	the	development	of	this	core-periphery	divide	by	using	Optimum	Currency	Area	(OCA)	and	World	Systems	theories	(WST)	to	interpret	the	refinement.				This	paper	has	been	divided	into	two	distinct	sections:	literature	review,	and	hypothesis	testing	through	data	analysis.	Chapter	2	covers	the	general	guidelines	of	the	EMU	and	its	approach	towards	achieving	full	economic	convergence	in	the	Euro	Area.	Furthermore,	the	possibility	of	the	euro	being	a	facilitator	for	the	development	of	macroeconomic	divergence	will	be	discussed	in	relation	to	OCA	theory	and	its	criteria.	Finally,	Chapter	2	will	consider	the	World	Systems	theory	and	the	possibility	that	these	imbalances	have	been	a	natural	consequence	of	the	recklessness	and	negligence	of	macroeconomic	policies	by	the	(semi-)peripheral	countries.	On	the	basis	of	the	investigated	theory,	two	hypotheses	have	been	formed	and	are	laid	out	in	Chapter	3.	Finally,	Chapter	4	tests	the	hypotheses	against	data	on	macroeconomic	developments	in	selected	Eurozone	countries.			
	 	 	
	
3		1.1 Research	questions		This	project	uses	the	OCA	and	WS	theories	as	a	framework	for	evaluating	and	analysing	the	causes	and	development	of	macroeconomic	divergence	between	the	Northern	and	Southern	EMU	Member	States.			The	objective	is	to	answer	the	following	research	questions:			
• How	have	the	economic	imbalances	developed	in	the	Eurozone?	Were	there	any	significant	disparities	before	the	conception	of	the	euro?		
• To	what	extent	did	the	adoption	of	a	common	currency	facilitate	the	imbalances?		
• To	what	extent	has	the	economic	negligence	of	PIIGS	nations	affected	the	divide	between	the	Member	States?		
• What	ramifications	does	this	have	for	the	integrity	of	the	European	Monetary	Union	in	the	future?			Additional	objectives	for	the	research	are:		
• to	understand	the	development	of	macroeconomic	imbalances	in	the	Eurozone		and,		
• to	discern	the	changes	that	have	altered	and	shaped	the	economy	to	the	way	we	perceive	it	today.				
	 4		
2 Literature	Review		Macroeconomic	divergence	has	posed	a	significant	problem	for	the	future	of	the	Eurozone.		Understanding	the	underlying	causes	behind	these	imbalances	will	aim	to	assist	in	the	confrontation	of	the	issues	they	have	generated	and	have	the	possibility	to	cause	in	the	future.	2.1 European	Monetary	Union	and	Economic	Convergence		The	Maastricht	Treaty,	stating	the	euro	convergence	criteria,	came	into	effect	in	1993.	Since	then	these	principles	have	stirred	debates	among	economists,	especially	the	criterion	concerning	fiscal	stabilisation	(ECBb,	2017).	The	European	Economic	and	Monetary	Union	reached	its	final	stage	in	1999	when	11	of	the	EU	Member	States	adopted	a	common	currency	by	irrevocable	fixing	of	exchange	rates.		However,	the	bank	notes	and	coins	were	not	launched	to	circulation	until	January	2002	(ECBa,	2017).	After	this	several	other	countries	have	joined	the	single	currency	area,	totalling	19	countries	to	date	(see	timeline	in	Appendix	A).	The	introduction	of	the	euro	granted	all	Member	States	an	easier	access	to	capital,	which	was	reflected	as	increases	in	government	debt.	However,	high	debt	levels	were	not	considered	to	be	a	major	issue	before	the	unravelling	of	the	financial	crisis	of	2007/08.		Convergence	has	been	a	recurring	motif	in	European	economic	integration	over	the	decades.	The	nominal	convergence	criteria,	namely	inflation,	interest	rate,	exchange	rate,	
and	public	deficit	and	debt,	which	objectively	aimed	not	only	to	create	a	single	currency,	but	a	stable	one	(Buti	and	Turrini,	2015).	The	European	Central	Bank	(ECB)	has	been	responsible	for	administrating	the	monetary	policy	and	price	stability	in	the	Euro	Area.	Currently,	stipulation	of	these	factors	has	been	attained	through	an	inflation	rate	close	to,	but	not	at,	2	per	cent.	Ideally,	nominal	convergence,	through	its	policies	on	the	elimination	of	exchange-rate	risks	and	macroeconomic	stability,	endorses	international	trade	and	financial	investment,	prompting	stronger	economic	growth	in	due	time	(Marelli	and	Signorelli,	2015).	Yet,	nominal	convergence	differs	dramatically	from	real	convergence,	which	emphasizes	the	processes	of	countries	involved	towards	equality	or	parallels	of	real	variables	of	the	economies	in	question,	instead	of	meeting	a	criteria	reflecting	macroeconomic	stability.	In	order	to	achieve	real	convergence,	a	MS	has	to	maintain	rapid	
	 	 	
	
5	yet	sustainable	growth	to	meet	the	EU	average,	which	has	turned	out	to	be	rather	impossible	given	the	current	circumstances	(Bongardt	and	Torres,	2013).				With	rise	in	economic	integration,	European	mixed	economies,	such	as	France	and	Ireland,	have	raised	issues	concerning	the	redefinition	of	economic	order	and	regulation	within	the	single	market	(Copelovitch	et	al.,	2016).	The	functioning	of	a	monetary	union	itself	presents	supplementary	demands	on		“the	concept	of	economic	union	with	respect	to	
macroeconomic	stabilisation”	(Bongardt	and	Torres,	2013).	Although	the	Maastricht	treaty	attempts	to	outline	the	coordination	between	economic	policies	in	an	economic	union,	however,	it	does	not	adequately	detail	the	requisites	for	a	monetary	union	and	has	left	several	points	uncovered.	De	Grauwe	(2007)	criticizes	the	strategy	endorsed	by	the	treaty	as	it	inflicts	negative	effects	on	real	economic	growth	created	by	the	eroding	effects	of	the	protective	fiscal	and	monetary	policies	several	MS	had	implemented.			Furthermore,	after	the	start	of	EMU	all	Member	States	are	required	to	comply	with	a	set	of	additional	nominal	criteria	specified	in	the	Growth	and	Stability	Pact	(SGP).	The	SGP	was	first	laid	down	in	the	Maastricht	treaty,	and	functions	as	a	central	element	of	the	coordination	of	economic	policy-making	in	European	Union	(EC,	2017).	Additionally,	the	SGP	encourages	and	aims	to	monitor	fiscal	discipline	within	the	union	while	securing	sustainable	public	finances.	Originally,	the	SGP	was	designed	to	set	tighter	restrictions	than	the	ones	described	in	the	Maastricht	Treaty,	i.e.	limiting	public	deficit	to	a	single	percentage	point	of	national	GDP	and	applying	monetary	sanctions	to	countries	that	breached	the	pact.	Although	the	SGP	has	defined	the	conditions	for	monitoring	multilateral	budgets	and	displayed	the	budgetary	rules	for	institutions,	the	implementation	and	supervision	of	its	provisions	has	been	poor.	Papadimoulis	(2016)	calls	into	question	the	effectiveness	and	validity	of	the	SGP,	as	many	traditionally	thriving	countries	including	Finland	and	Belgium	have	failed	to	meet	the	rules	and	requirements	of	the	pack.	This	is	evident	from	the	fact	that	no	MS	has	been	sanctioned	due	to	inordinate	deficits	in	spite	of	various	occurrences.			The	euro	was	originally	designed	to	unify	Europe	by	increasing	the	motive	for	economic	reciprocity,	yet	the	single	currency	and	a	unified	monetary	union	minimises	the	countries’	control	of	restoring	their	own	macroeconomic	problems	(Saunders,	2011).	This	has	proven	to	be	a	major	contributor	to	the	PIIGS	inability	to	control	their	current	account	balance	and	retaining	an	appropriate	level	of	government	debt.	In	spite	of	attempts	to	
	 6	initiate	stimulus	packages	in	core	nations	and	austerity	measures	in	heavily	indebted	countries,	the	financial	tragedy	is	becoming	increasingly	implicit	in	the	EMU	(Cohen	et	al.,	2012).	Since	financial	institutions	such	as	banks	have	acquired	a	great	deal	of	PIIGS’	government	debt,	many	large	banks	have	gained	immense	quantities	of	accounts	receivables.	The	fear	of	potential	insolvency	is	threatening	the	existence	of	the	EMU	if	issue	with	sovereign	debt	is	not	promptly	addressed	and	resolved.		2.2 Optimum	Currency	Areas		Research	carried	on	the	practicality	of	the	Optimum	Currency	Area	has	yielded	quite	controversial	discussions	recently	with	views	ranging	from	“something	of	a	dead-end	
problem”	(Johnson,	1969)	to	“major	contribution”	(El-Agraa,	2007).	First	coined	by	Robert	Mundell	(1961),	the	OCA	theory	defines	the	criteria	and	identifies	the	risks	and	benefits	of	joining	a	single	currency	area.	Despite	Mundell’s	efforts	to	outline	a	selection	of	criteria,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	OCA	theory	should	be	considered	as	a	compilation	of	several	theories	that	have	developed	over	time	as	a	result	of	further	discussions2.	Mundell’s	(1961)	initial	model	states	that	each	member	of	an	OCA	should	satisfy	four	(4)	distinct	criteria.	Firstly,	there	should	be	an	increased	labour	mobility	in	the	area,	which	includes	free	movement	and	lack	of	cultural	barriers,	for	instance.	Secondly,	capital	mobility,	and	price	and	wage	flexibility	that	maintains	a	balanced	economic	system	through	distribution	of	capital	where	it	is	required.	Thirdly,	Mundell	suggests	that	a	risk-sharing	system	that	calls	for	the	distribution	of	capital	to	regions	experiencing	economic	difficulties	should	be	implemented.	Finally,	all	members	ought	to	have	similar	business	cycles	in	order	to	accurately	allocate	risks	and	economic	booms.	This	would	allow	the	central	banks	to	negate	and	disseminate	economic	recessions	by	stimulating	growth	and	controlling	inflation	rates.			According	to	the	criteria	outlined	above,	theory	suggests	that	a	monetary	union	can	be	formed	between	independent	states	only	if	the	fundamental	economic	structures	between	the	applicant	member	states	line	up	sufficiently	(Mundell,	1961).	Thus,	the	standards	set	should	be	satisfied	ex	ante	to	avoid	excessive	expenditure.	On	the	contrary,	the	endogenous	OCA	theory	proclaims	that	a	monetary	union	is	a	competent	propeller	towards	convergence	in	economic	performance	and	policies,	therefore	suggesting	that	the	MS	might	not	need	to	meet	the	required	conditions	ex	ante.																																										 																					2	Subsequently,	Mundell’s	theory	was	complemented	by	McKinnon	(2004)	and	Kenen	(1969).	
	 	 	
	
7		Although	economic	heterogeneity	can	be	viewed	as	a	symbol	of	strong	and	thriving	economies,	this	is	not	always	the	case.	Recent	studies	(Punzi	and	Rabitsch,	2016;	Ravenna	and	Walsh,	2011)	have	stressed	that	the	development	of	non-simultaneous	business	cycle	oscillations,	which	could	hinder	the	sufficient	monitoring	of	stabilisation	policies	in	a	currency	area,	might	be	enhanced	by	some	factors	of	economic	heterogeneity.		Furthermore,	the	homogenous	structural	characteristics	between	OCA	Member	States	have	been	highlighted	as	necessary	for	downsizing	the	possibility	and	frequency	of	asymmetric	shocks,	and	reducing	their	ramifications	(Bayoumi,	1997;	Gibson,	2014).	The	endogenous	capitalistic	dynamics	may	have	persisted	at	a	national	level;	however,	the	formation	of	a	monetary	union	did	not	transfer	these	policies	into	a	EU-wide	action.	In	his	subsequent	paper,	Mundell	(1973)	demonstrates	the	possibility	of	mitigating	asymmetric	shocks	by	common	monetary	policy,	which	would	contribute	towards	diversification	and	greater	access	to	resources	amongst	the	MS.	Furthermore,	McKinnon	(2004)	demonstrates,	with	a	data	sample	from	European	bond	markets,	that	the	most	efficient	way	of	sharing	risks	in	a	monetary	union	is	through	asset	diversification.	With	floating	exchange	rates,	countries	would	have	to	endure	domestic	shocks	independently.	However,	the	presence	of	EMU	allows	states	to	share	a	portion	of	negative	repercussions	with	other	Member	States	(Kalemli-Ozcan	et	al.,	2001).		Mundell	(1961),	MicKinnon	(1963)	and	Kenen	(1969)	have	all	formed	a	consensus	that	the	higher	the	specialisation	degree	of	a	particular	region	is	the	more	susceptible	it	becomes	to	asymmetric	shocks.	Thus	an	area	with	a	high	level	of	regional	specialisation	would	be	ineligible	to	become	a	single	currency	area.	A	problem	arises	only	if	free	movement	of	goods	and	capital	are	considered,	as	this	has	the	potential	to	induce	elevated	regional	specialisation.	Pelagidis	(1996)	believes	this	to	be	probable	and	notes	that	economic	theory	indicates	that	the	deeper	the	market	integration	is	the	higher	the	specialisation	will	be.	This	has	a	possibility	to	create	a	paradox	in	which	factor	mobility	(a	condition	for	an	OCA)	will	corrode	diversity,	destroying	the	fundamental	conditions	for	the	EMU.	Eichengreen	(1993)	offers	a	more	optimistic	view	that	the	homogeneity	in	the	economic	systems	is	in	fact	reinforced	by	heightened	competition	and	the	integration	of	markets	i.e.	in	the	EMU	this	could	be	the	result	of	the	Single	Market	or	the	relaxation	of	capital	flows,	for	instance.	This	is	evident	from	the	empirical	studies	conducted	by	Marelli	and	Signorelli	(2015),	which	demonstrate	an	increase	in	synchronicity	in	both	core	and	peripheral	countries.		
	 8	The	OCA	theory	has	been	heavily	criticised	and	challenged	by	several	economists,	claiming	that	the	EMU	contributed	to	the	aggravation	of	economic	imbalances	(Buiter,	1995).	Some	have	also	argued	that	the	initiation	of	a	common	currency	should	have	been	suspended	until	the	union	had	fulfilled	all	the	necessary	OCA	criteria	(Goodhart,	1995).	Goodhart	(1995),	for	instance,	calls	into	question	the	necessity	of	having	economic	criteria	at	all.	He	also	argues	that	political	deliberation,	rather	than	an	economic	one,	propelled	the	creation	of	the	EMU.		Furthermore,	Tavlas	(2009)	points	out	that	the	foundation	for	the	OCA	theory	was	developed	many	decades	ago,	suggesting	that	the	theory	might	not	be	entirely	directly	applicable	in	the	present	day.	Gibson	(2014),	on	the	other	hands,	points	out	the	unfeasibility	ingrained	within	the	monetary	union.	Although	the	monetary	policy	of	the	Eurozone	is	centralised,	other	macroeconomic	policies	have	stayed	under	the	control	of	their	respective	national	governments	causing	idiosyncratic	shifts	uninhibited	by	the	single	currency	(Gibson,	2014;	De	Grauwe,	2014).				Mundell’s	original	concept	is	commonly	used	as	supporting	evidence	for	Eurozone’s	lack	of	compliance	to	some	of	the	conditions,	disqualifying	the	union	as	an	OCA	(Pasimeni,	2014;	Scharpf,	2015).	In	the	case	of	the	EMU,	the	presence	of	a	monetary	union	might	have	provoked	the	booms	and	busts	cycle	at	a	national	level	(De	Grauwe,	2014).		The	rationale	behind	this	the	levels	of	single	interest	rate	imposed	by	ECB	on	the	MS:	unduly	high	for	countries	in	recession	and	too	low	for	the	booming	economies.	As	the	PIIGS	economies	began	to	prosper,	their	inflation	levels	followed.	Thus	the	real	interest	rates	fell	and	exacerbated	the	booms	whereas	their	neighbouring	countries	encountering	recession	experienced	the	opposite.	Moreover,	Ederer	and	Reschenhofer	(2013)	argue	that	the	wage	and	price	flexibility	EMU	grants	are	not	sufficient	enough	to	assure	readjustments	after	economic	shocks.	This,	combined	with	limited	labour	migration	and	divergent	price	developments	amongst	nations,	decreased	the	real	interest	rates	in	high-inflation	and	fast	growing	nations	further	aggravating	domestic	demand	and	the	economic	boom.	In	addition,	McKinnon	(2004)	stresses	that	Mundell’s	original	model	did	not	recognise	these	prospects	for	mitigating	asymmetric	shocks	since	“capital	controls	limited	the	possibilities	
for	international	risk-sharing”	in	the	time	period.	This	implies	that	Mundell	did	not	have	logical	reason	to	examine	international	portfolio	diversification;	hence	even	his	revised	design	remains	rather	modest.				General	consensus	suggests	that	the	inefficient	balance	of	national	economies	is	largely	due	to	inadequate	stabilisation	of	domestic	marginal	costs	and	“the	monetary	movements	
unrelated	to	the	fundamentals	of	a	country”	(Pisani-Ferry,	2010).	De	Grauwe	(2014)	
	 	 	
	
9	believes	that	this	is	the	result	of	poor	transposition	of	stabilisers	from	the	national	level	to	the	monetary	union	level;	leaving	the	MS	fragile	and	incapable	to	defend	themselves	against	national	upheavals.	Furthermore,	the	adoption	of	a	common	currency	also	costs	each	Member	State	their	ability	to	operate	their	own	fiscal	and	monetary	policy	mediations	to	stabilise	their	national	economies.	According	to	Baldwin	and	Wyplosz	(2006),	the	loss	of	economic	monetary	policy	sovereignty	becomes	severely	important	for	EMU	Member	States	if	poorly	integrated	member	countries	encounter	asymmetric	macroeconomic	shocks.	Mankiw	(2007)	insists	that	acclimation	to	these	shocks	needs	to	ensue	from	labour	mobility,	fiscal	transfer	payments	and	readjustments	in	price	and	wage	levels.		Mongelli	(2002)	warned	the	EMU	about	the	costs	that	could	stem	from	negative	external	effects	such	as	Member	States	running	larger,	protracted	budget	deficits	that	could	seriously	detrain	international	confidence	in	the	common	currency.	Although	the	common	currency	has	presented	significant	issues,	Member	States	are	quite	unlikely	to	exit	the	union	due	to	high	economic	costs.	It	has	also	been	argued	that	the	one	of	the	greatest	contributors	to	the	economic	divergence	in	the	Eurozone	was	the	poor	governance	on	the	implementation	of	regulations	(Pisani-Ferry,	2010).	The	Greek	crisis	clearly	indicates	that	the	measures	that	were	used	to	follow	public	finances	did	not	function	as	originally	planned.	This	has	been	emphasised	futher	by	Pisani-Ferry’s	(2010)	argument	that	the	“monitoring	of	budgetary	situations	within	the	framework	of	the	…	[SGP]	has	gradually	
evolved	in	the	direction	of	putting	emphasis	on	the	structural,	or	cyclically	adjusted,	
balance”.	2.3 World	Systems	Theory		In	the	late	1970’s,	Immanuel	Wallerstein	(2004)	developed	the	most	well	known	version	of	the	World	Systems	Theory,	categorising	all	nations	into	three	categories:	periphery,	semi-periphery	and	core.	The	theory	attempts	to	illustrate	the	relationship,	and	the	dynamic	and	geopolitical	position	of	different	countries	in	relation	to	one	another.		Wallerstein	(2004)	suggests	that	the	underlying	structure	in	our	modern,	capitalist	world-system	allows	the	powerful	core	countries	to	exploit	the	weaker,	peripheral	countries	while	the	semi-periphery	stands	somewhere	in	the	middle.	Although	the	world	systems	theory	has	drawn	inspiration	from	dependency	theory3,	as	the	focuses	of	these	two																																									 																					3	Dependency	theory	originated	in	1949	when	Hans	Singer	and	Raúl	Prebisch	discovered	that	there	is	a	flow	of	resources	from	the	poor	and	undeveloped	”peripheral”	states	to	the	richer	”core”	states	whilst	exploring	the	terms	of	trade	between	different	countries	(Trouvé	et	al.,	2010).	
	 10	theories	differ	tremendously.	Wallerstein’s	theory	has	been	credited	to	be	one	of	the	most	significant	step	in	determining	the	division	between	states	of	the	world	(Arrighi		and		Drangel,		1986).	Not	only	has	this	been	a	substantial	economic	discovery,	it	has	also	disclosed	the	political	parameters	that	have	facilitated	such	a	structure	of	exploitation.	Nonetheless,	the	imperious	position	of	the	core	countries	has	diminished	slightly	due	to	the	admittance	of	an	intermediate	layer	as	it	minimised	the	extent	of	direct	appropriation	of	the	periphery.	However,	this	now	creates	pressure	on	the	semi-peripheral	countries	that	function	as	a	buffer	layer	between	the	two	extremes.			There	has	been	some	debate	over	the	classification	of	certain	countries,	especially	after	the	introduction	of	the	semi-periphery.	This	is	mainly	due	to	the	developments	that	have	caused	a	shift	from	one	category	to	another	(Chase-Dunn,	Kawana	and	Brewer,	2000).	In	addition,	the	differentiation	of	semi-periphery	caused	difficulties,	especially	in	the	beginning.	Generally,	technology	has	been	identified	as	one	of	the	main	differentiators	between	the	three	aforementioned	categories.	Many	have	argued	that	the	peripheral	nations	are	fundamentally	unable	to	reach	the	same	level	of	development	as	the	core	countries,	thus	affirming	their	own	auxiliary	status	(Skocpol,	1977;	Chase-Dunn	and	Grimes,	1995).	This	contrast	in	power	between	states	is	pivotal	for	preserving	equilibrium	within	the	system,	as	stronger	countries	intensify	and	raise	the	flow	of	surplus	capital	towards	the	core.	Wallerstein	called	this	relocation	of	surplus	capital	from	proletarian	regions	to	the	industrialised	core	an	unequal	exchange,	which	inevitably	contributes	to	global	capital	accumulation	and	appropriation	of	periphery	(Wallerstein,	2004;	Sorinel,	2010).			The	financial	crisis	has	effectively	reiterated	the	core-periphery	friction	in	Europe,	sustaining	the	‘hierarchy	of	nation-states’	(Coakley,	2016).	Johnson	(2012)	suggests	that	the	key	factor	behind	this	issue	was	the	expectation	that	all	of	the	Member	States’	“economies	would	converge	in	productivity”,	which	resulted	in	a	backlash,	further	increasing	the	divide	(Sonderman,	2012).	It	could	be	argued	that	from	the	perspective	of	unbalanced	global	relations,	the	notional	source	of	debt	is	generated	by	the	appropriation	of	the	peripheral	states	by	the	core	nations.	Hence	the	absence	of	a	prosperous	and	dynamic	import-substitution	policy	causes	semi-peripheral	countries	to	an	endless	cycle	of	borrowing	from	the	core	to	neutralise	their	shortcomings	in	infrastructure,	technology	and	innovation	(Fouskas	and	Dimoulas,	2013).	Jones	(2011),	on	the	other	hands,	argues	that	export-lead	growth	countries	have	been	a	considerable	contributor	towards	macroeconomic	imbalances,	which	have	for	their	part	facilitated	debt	crises	and	asset	
	 	 	
	
11	market	bubbles.		Furthermore,	given	the	abovementioned	attributes,	the	WST	suggests	that	the	social	system	is	the	preeminent	component	in	the	analysis.	This	can	be	examined	in	a	national	level	or	in	a	supranational	level	as	in	the	case	with	the	EMU	(Reyes,	2001).	For	instance,	many	of	the	PIIGS	nations	regarded	the	engagement	in	European	integration	both	as	an	opportunity	to	enhance	living	conditions	and	an	affirmation	of	stability	for	these	newly	established	democracies.			Razin	and	Rosenfielde	(2012)	argue	that	real	cooperation	between	EU	Member	States	is	a	prerequisite	for	macroeconomic	stability,	which	seems	to	have	ceased	to	exist.	Similarly,	Coakley	(2016)	argues	that	the	EU	has	converted	from	unified	and	harmonious	coalition	of	states	into	becoming	a	more	strained	alliance.	This	is	evident	for	instance	from	the	political	conflict	in	2010	that	divided	the	Eurozone:	the	struggling	periphery	needed	urgent	financial	assistance	from	the	core	nations.	This	combined	with	the	loss	of	confidence	for	the	EU	and	its	institutions	incited	left-wing	anti-austerity	groups	to	deter	the	prevailing	power	structures	in	the	PIIGS	nations.	For	example,	the	election	of	Syriza	in	Greece	in	2015	effectively	bid	the	core	and	semi-peripheral	countries	against	one	another	(Lapavitsas,	2015).	Another	example	of	this	is	the	lack	of	workforce	mobility	as	the	MS	are	desperately	safeguarding	jobs	in	their	own	countries.	This	has	caused	severe	difficulties	with	unemployment	in	the	peripheral	countries	that	cannot	be	mitigated	by	migration	of	workforce	to	the	core	(Kroet,	2016;	Bräuninger	and	Majowski,	2011).	Kersan	Škabić	(2012)	also	raises	concerns	about	the	lack	of	institutional	requirements	necessitating	the	richer	core	nations	to	assist	the	poorer	countries	as	it	disconnects	parts	of	the	union	from	one	another.		In	Europe,	the	current	account	deficit	and	trade	imbalances	of	the	PIIGS	nations	compared	to	many	core	countries	have	caused	some	friction	amongst	academics	in	terms	of	the	future	of	the	euro.	The	most	prominent	theory	behind	this	divide	is	the	lack	of	participation	and	loss	of	competitiveness	on	the	behalf	of	the	PIIGS	(Jones,	2011;	Bernanke,	2015;	di	Mauro,	2016;	Sinn,	2013).	Unlike	countries	with	their	unique	national	currency,	the	PIIGS	cannot	devalue	their	currency	in	order	to	settle	their	current	account	deficits.	The	PIIGS	nations	have	been	entitled	“selfish”	and	“reckless”	on	several	occasions,	but	to	what	extent	have	they	really	neglected	their	responsibilities	as	part	of	the	union?						
	 12			2.4 Literature	Summary		In	review,	the	literature	investigated	has	given	valuable	knowledge	and	insight	into	several	different	aspects	of	the	research	topic.	Firstly,	macroeconomic	complications	in	the	Eurozone	have	largely	been	caused	by	structural	imbalances,	which	have	effectively	prevented	macroeconomic	stability.	The	convergence	criteria	established	in	the	Maastricht	treaty	have	been	criticized	for	being	insufficient	and	nominal,	focusing	only	on	a	limited	array	of	simple	elements	(Bongardt	and	Torres,	2013).	Real	convergence,	on	the	other	hand,	was	essentially	expected	to	make	the	European	Monetary	Union	partaking	countries	more	homogenous	in	terms	of	their	economic	structures,	thus	bringing	the	Optimum	Currency	Area	and	EMU	conditions	closer	together	and	alleviating	the	pressure	off	of	the	nominal	criteria	originally	stated	in	the	Maastricht	treaty.	It	should	be	still	noted	that	although	the	Maastricht	convergence	criteria	are	partly	established	on	the	OCA	theory,	these	two	still	do	not	fully	align	with	one	another.			Sustainability	and	Growth	Pact	was	created	to	fulfil	the	gaps	in	the	treaty	concerning	fiscal	policies	(Papadimoulis,	2016).	The	efficiency	and	practicality	of	it	has	been	called	into	question,	since	the	monetary	sanctions	have	not	been	imposed	on	countries	breaching	the	contract	despite	that	being	one	of	the	main	objectives	of	the	pact.			Wyplosz	(2006)	argues	that	the	euro	has	been	a	triumph,	however,	the	topic	has	raised	many	auxiliary	problems	with	it.		Poor	governance	over	the	monetary	policy	and	a	lack	of	fiscal	policy	with	the	absence	of	dynamic	import-substitution	policy	causes	peripheral	countries	to	an	endless	cycle	of	borrowing.			Although	economic	heterogeneity	has	been	most	often	view	as	good	sign,	some	have	suggested	that	under	OCA	theory	diverse	economies	are	a	higher	risk	when	it	comes	to	asymmetric	shocks	(Ravenna	and	Walsh,	2011).	Several	economists	have	also	concluded	that	increased	specialisation	predisposes	countries	to	idiosyncratic	shocks.	The	OCA	theory	has	also	been	under	scrutiny,	many	have	claimed	that	the	EMU	was	the	main	contributor	to	the	aggravation	of	economic	imbalances	in	Europe.			Despite	the	fact	that	WST	has	been	built	upon	dependency	theory,	it	should	be	noted	that	they	are	fundamentally	different	since	they	focus	on	different	aspects	of	the	core-
	 	 	
	
13	periphery	divide.	Some	theorise	that	the	dispersion	could	be	a	direct	consequence	of	the	reckless	actions	of	the	PIIGS,	whilst	others	believe	that	it	might	have	been	due	to	the	EMU.	Nonetheless,	the	cooperation	required	for	attaining	macroeconomic	stability	is	not	present	between	the	Member	States	at	the	moment	(Razin	and	Rosenfielde,	2012).																																		
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3 Research	Methodology		3.1 Research	Approach		The	research	conducted	in	this	dissertation	is	mainly	based	on	positivist	approach,	and	aims	to	mimic	and	adapt	scientific	methodology	into	economics.	The	paper	will	examine	the	underlying	causes	of	economic	divergence	in	the	Eurozone	through	quantitative	analysis	and	hypothesis	testing,	thus	the	data	collection	and	analysis	for	this	research	project	will	mostly	follow	a	deductive	approach.	Gulati	(2009)	states	that	“deductive	means	
reasoning	from	the	particular	to	the	general”	or	forming	conclusions	from	existing	propositions,	and	is	often	used	in	researching	case	studies	or	theoretical	subjects.	In	addition,	Bryman	and	Bell	(2011)	agree	that	this	approach	is	most	frequently	applied	in	business	research	where	hypotheses	are	tested	against	the	researched	theory,	thus	helping	the	researcher	to	conclude	on	the	existing	relations	between	the	theory	and	the	research	outcomes.	This	technique	has	also	been	recommended	for	beginners	due	to	its	straightforwardness	and	logical	reasoning	in	linking	premises	with	conclusions.		The	research	objectives	for	this	paper	were	designed	on	the	basis	of	mixed-method	research,	including	both	quantitative	and	qualitative	research.	On	the	basis	of	the	reviewed	theories,	two	distinct	hypotheses	were	formed.	The	following	hypotheses	will	be	tested	through	a	thorough	analysis	of	existing	data	in	order	to	conclusively	respond	to	previously	stated	research	questions:		 1. The	disparities	between	the	PIIGS	and	the	core	nations	were	caused	by	the	adoption	of	a	common	currency.		 2. The	negligence	of	semi-peripheral	countries	assisted	in	the	development	of	macroeconomic	imbalances	in	the	Eurozone.		 								
	 	 	
	
15			3.2 Data	Collection	and	Analysis		This	dissertation	is	composed	as	a	secondary	research	as	it	is	mostly	based	on	current	literature	on	an	on-going	event.	This	is	due	to	the	implausibility	of	sufficient	primary	data	collection	for	such	a	small-scale	research.	Applied,	relevant	material	has	been	gathered	from	academic	journals	and	articles,	reports,	books,	working	papers	and	statistical	databases.	In	places	where	academic	literature	has	not	been	present	or	provided	encompassing	information,	newspaper	articles	and	Internet-based	sources	have	been	employed	to	broaden	the	perspectives.			Through	an	analysis	of	various	key	indicators,	ranging	from	unemployment	to	interest	rates	and	inflation,	the	advancements	in	macroeconomic	imbalances	in	the	Euro	Area	can	be	explored	thoroughly.	This	review	will	focus	largely	on	the	development	and	changes	in	aforementioned	metrics	over	a	30-year	period	in	order	to	have	a	comparison	before	and	after	the	induction	of	a	common	currency.	In	cases	where	data	has	been	lacking,	professional	estimates,	or	a	further	explanation,	have	been	provided	to	complete	the	set.			The	countries	chosen	for	this	study	are:	Finland,	France,	Germany,	Greece,	Ireland,	Italy,	the	Netherlands,	Portugal	and	Spain.	The	PIIGS	nations	were	selected	due	to	their	clear	difficulties	in	complying	with	the	EMU	requisites,	and	their	significant	deficits.	In	comparison	Finland,	France,	Germany,	and	the	Netherlands	have	been	predominantly	well-performing	core	countries	that	have	had	current	account	surpluses	in	recent	years.	Moreover,	all	of	the	abovementioned	countries	were	also	part	of	the	original	11	countries,	with	the	addition	of	Greece,	adopting	the	common	currency.										
	 16	3.3 Limitations		This	research	focuses	solely	on	the	economic	aspects	of	the	issue.	However,	due	to	the	nature	and	scope	of	this	project,	only	certain	main	influences	have	been	researched	in	greater	detail.			In	addition,	this	review	focuses	only	on	the	PIIGS	nations	and	carefully	selected	core	nations	with	extensive	current	account	surpluses.	Although	the	research	is	using	a	more	scientific	approach	to	undertake	the	hypotheses,	the	sample	size	of	9	countries	is	still	quite	narrow.	In	terms	of	generating	a	larger	scale	research	on	the	matter,	it	would	be	advisable	to	include	more	EZ	countries	in	the	comparison	in	order	to	fully	understand	the	extent	and	development	of	the	issue.	Furthermore,	due	to	the	scale	of	this	study,	the	analysis	only	covers	the	time	period	from	1987-2016.			Since	the	research	mainly	relies	on	second	hand	data	collection,	the	creditability	of	the	data	could	have	been	compromised.	This	could	be	due	to	the	lack	of	primary	research	conducted	in	these	areas,	an	inaccurate	or	faulty	data	collection	and	presentation,	or	distortion	of	measurements	provided	by	governments.																		
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4 Discussion,	Analysis	and	Discussion		Several	variables	measuring	the	real	convergence	in	the	euro	area,	including	unemployment	rate,	GDP	per	capita	and	real	effective	exchange	rate	(REER),	will	be	analysed	in	order	to	evaluate	the	hypotheses.			4.1 Unemployment		One	of	the	major	measures	of	macroeconomic	divergence	is	the	dispersion	of	unemployment	amongst	EZ	Member	States.	The	collected	data	suggests	that	most	of	the	EZ	countries	have	maintained	their	unemployment	rates	between	approximately	5	–	10	per	cent	(hereafter	denoted	as	%).	During	the	early	1990s	European	recession,	most	countries	experienced	some	increases	in	their	domestic	unemployment	rates;	however,	there	are	three,	two	of	them	being	PIIGS	nations	(see	Fig.	1.).				Ireland’s	unemployment	peak	in	the	turn	of	the	decade	was	the	aftermath	of	large-scale	emigration,	poor	governmental	monetary	policies	and	global	economic	instability	(Walsh,	2003).	Nonetheless	the	increase	in	foreign	direct	investment	and	the	implementation	of	several	national	economic	programmes	devised	to	reduce	i.e.	inflation	in	the	mid-1990s	increased	domestic	employment	(Barry,	2003).	Spain	had	experienced	comparable	issues	after	a	long	recessional	period	(1976-85)	after	the	Franco	dictatorship	ended	and	transitioned	into	a	democracy,	as	did	Portugal.	Joining	to	the	EU	created	a	tremendous	increase	in	temporary	positions,	however,	in	the	1991-94	European	recession	Spain	was	hit	exceptionally	hard	due	to	the	overvalued	exchange	rate	of	the	peseta	(Bentolila	and	Jimeno,	2006).	Finland	was	the	only	core	nation	that	experienced	a	major	surge	in	unemployment	as	the	Soviet	Union,	one	of	their	main	export	destination	countries,	disintegrated	(Honkapohja	et	al.,	1999).		After	the	euro	was	launched	at	the	turn	of	the	century,	there	seems	to	be	a	brief	period	convergence	in	unemployment	rates	before	the	debt	crisis.	Throughout	the	EMU	enlargement	period	(2000-2007)	a	declining	pattern	in	the	unemployment	rates	can	be	observed,	with	the	omission	of	Portugal.	This	has	also	been	followed	by	a	noticeable	contraction	in	the	dissemination	of	these	rates	until	the	financial	crisis.	The	economic	crisis	has	definitely	affirmed	the	heterogeneity	of	employment	between	the	MS,	as	can	be	determined	from	the	significant	gap	between	the	lowest	(Greece)	and	highest	(Germany)	
	 18	performing	country.		The	difference	in	the	unemployment	rates	between	the	two	extremes	was	over	20	percentage	points	in	2013,	giving	a	standard	deviation	of	8.1%.				It	could	also	be	argued	that	the	decline	of	the	rates	has	been	marginally	faster	after	the	formation	of	the	EMU	until	2007.	The	extent	of	the	reduction	of	this	variable	is	directly	proportional	to	the	level	of	initial	unemployment,	a	classic	example	being	Spain.	Nonetheless,	divergence	in	the	rate	of	unemployment	has	dramatically	increased	since	2007,	exceeding	levels	that	have	predominated	for	the	last	three	decades.			
	Fig.	1.		Unemployment	rates	(1987-2016)	per	country	(IMF	World	Economic	Outlook	Database,	2017).			These	shifts	in	unemployment	rates	could	be	due	to	changes	in	business	cycles	or	the	presence	of	asymmetric	economic	shocks,	notwithstanding	the	correlation	between	inflation	and	unemployment	(see	Appendix	B).	Furthermore,	the	limited	labour	mobility	within	the	EA	and	the	absence	of	a	stabilising	fiscal	union	that	could	function	as	a	risk-sharing	component	against	many	country-specific	shocks.	Boeri	and	Jimeno	(2015)	go	as	far	as	to	claim	that	European	unemployment	gaps	are	mostly	a	direct	consequence	of	
0.00%	
5.00%	
10.00%	
15.00%	
20.00%	
25.00%	
30.00%	
1987	 1988	 1989	 1990	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994	 1995	 1996	 1997	 1998	 1999	 2000	 2001	 2002	 2003	 2004	 2005	 2006	 2007	 2008	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	 2016	
Unemployment	Rates	per	country		(1987	-	2016)	
Finland	 France	 Germany	 Greece	 Ireland	Italy	 Netherlands	 Portugal	 Spain	
	 	 	
	
19	variations	in	labour	market	institutions	and	their	responses	to	economic	shocks.	These	factors	also	concur	with	the	theory	on	the	EZ	not	fulfilling	the	OCA	criteria.			The	paradox	with	the	current	situation	is	that	without	higher	aggregate	demand	the	Euro	Area	could	encounter	an	increase	in	structural	unemployment,	however,	the	structural	reforms	might	not	be	entirely	sustainable	for	many	countries.	Whereas	without	the	reforms,	the	measures	on	aggregate	demand	will	swiftly	become	exhausted	and	possibly	lose	their	effectiveness	in	the	long	run	(Draghi,	2014).			4.2 GDP	per	capita		As	mentioned	before,	in	order	to	attain	real	convergence	the	lower-income	member	states	need	have	to	uphold	rapid	yet	sustainable	growth	to	align	with	high-income	states.			
	Fig.2.	GDP	per	capita	(US	$)	from	1987	to	2015	(World	Bank,	2017).			
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	 20	The	GDP	per	capita	has	been	diverging	and	not	converging	as	expected	after	the	EMU.	As	Fig.2.	above	suggests	the	PIIGS	nations,	with	the	exception	of	Ireland,	have	performed	significantly	worse	than	their	Northern	counterparts.	This	could	have	been	a	result	of	limited	competition	in	sectors,	which	have	not	been	subjected	to	global	markets.	Although	there	were	some	serious	attempts	to	limit	the	deficit	and	reduce	public	debt	in	the	1990s,	resulting	in	nearly	balanced	public	finances	in	2000,	net	lending	increased	again	after	the	introduction	of	the	euro,	despite	falling	interest	costs.	In	addition,	large	tax	rates,	followed	by	enduring	deficits,	and	a	intense	public	debt	level	could	be	argued	to	have	been	a	significant	factor	for	stagnating	economic	growth.		According	to	the	beta-convergence	approach4	GDP	per	capita	of	different	countries	can	be	evaluated	and	investigated	in	terms	of	whether	they	are	converging	to	a	singular	level.	The	regression	on	pre-crisis	interval	detects	a	clear	convergence	between	states;	however,	this	soon	disappears	after	the	start	of	the	financial	crisis.	The	most	feasible	explanation	for	this	trend	is	that	nominal	convergence,	after	the	successful	adoption	of	the	euro	and	fulfilment	of	the	Maastricht	criteria,	contributed	towards	a	legitimate	integration	of	the	EZ	countries	coinciding	with	endogeneity	of	the	OCA	theory	criteria.																																																										 																					4	Calculations	have	been	conducted	by	Marelli	and	Signorelli	(2015)	and	can	be	found	from	Appendix	C.	
	 	 	
	
21	4.3 Government	debt	
		Fig.	3.	Consolidated	government	debt	as	a	percentage	of	GDP	(Statistical	Data	Warehouse,	2017)		In	order	to	keep	the	data	manageable,	national	government	debts	are	presented	on	a	consolidated	basis5.		Nearly	all	EMU	countries	acquired	more	debt	after	2008,	mostly	due	to	a	mix	of	increased	borrowing	costs	and	larger	expenditures.	Thus,	by	2015,	most	of	the	countries	that	were	struck	hardest	by	the	financial	crisis,	namely	the	PIIGS,	displayed	paramount	debt-to-GDP	ratios.	Despite	the	fact	that	excessive	debt	levels	have	mostly	been	an	issue	for	the	periphery,	it	seems	to	have	seeped	through	to	the	core	possibly	as	a	result	of	bank	bailouts	and	financial	aid	packages	(Mody	and	Sandri,	2011).	4.4 Current	account	balances		Figure	5	on	the	following	page	depicts	the	development	of	current	account	balances	as	a	percentage	of	national	GDP	in	the	selected	EA	countries.			
																																								 																					5	The	calculations	do	not	take	into	account	transactions	that	have	been	conducted	across	a	single	sector,	i.e.	loan	swaps	between	non-financial	institutions	(OECD,	2014).	
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	 22	The	current	account	imbalances	were	at	a	moderate	level	in	the	pre-EMU	era,	despite	few	countries	were	displaying	sizeable	disproportions:	Portugal	and	Greece	on	deficit,	and	Finland	on	surplus.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	the	2000-2007	period	in	the	EMU	consists	of	two	phases:	economic	expansion	and	crisis.	The	former	is	often	associated	with	a	significant	broadening	of	current	account	imbalances,	until	being	almost	entirely	dismantled	by	the	latter.	This	seems	to	indicate	a	serious	cyclical	pattern	that	regulates	the	economic	system6.		
	Fig.	4.	Current	account	balance	as	a	percentage	of	GDP	(IMF	World	Economic	Outlook	Database,	2017)		Exaggerated,	optimistic	domestic	booms	deriving	from	fiscal	exuberance	and	cheap	credit	is	one	of	the	explanations	for	the	large	current	account	deficits	that	are	evident	after	the	euro	began	circulation.	It	also	appears	that	during	periods	of	higher	consumer	spending	and	consumer-led	economic	growth,	the	amount	spent	on	imported	goods	will	increase	(see	Appendix	B).	From	this,	it	could	be	concluded	that	GDP	growth	has	had	a	substantial	negative	impact	on	the	current	accounts.	Since	2000,	this	cycle	seems	to	have	become	more	robust.	Calculations	have	also	revealed	a	negative	relationship	between	the	current	
																																								 																					6	Empirical	evidence	suggests	that	this	seems	to	have	become	more	apparent	post-EMU	(Estrada,	Galí	and	López-Salido,	2013).	
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23	accounts	and	price	competitiveness	(Appendix	C).	These	relative	rises	in	prices	are	often	correlated	with	the	surge	of	current	account	deficits	post-2007.			As	current	EMU	(semi-)peripheral	countries,	which	share	a	resemblance	with	the	newer	MS,	demonstrate	how	joining	the	euro	with	a	feeble	current	account	can	lead	to	steadfast	CA	imbalances.	These	could	induce	a	serious	slow	down	in	the	recovering	process,	similarly	to	Portugal’s	experience.	4.5 Real	Effective	Exchange	Rate			Before	assessing	convergence	of	interest	rates,	it	is	crucial	to	differentiate	between	nominal	and	real	interest	rates7.	Assuming	the	nominal	interest	rates’	convergence	in	the	EMU	was	established,	REER	still	may	not	be	overlooked.	Persistent	features	of	inflation	can	prompt	radically	diverse	real	interest	rates,	in	which	low	REER	are	often	associated	with	higher	inflation	rates	(Drastichová,	2013).		
Fig	5.	REER	1987-2015	(Bluenomics,	2017).		
																																								 																					7	For	more	in-depth	evaluation	see	Mongelli	(2002).	
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	 24	As	depicted	in	Fig	5.,	the	REER	fluctuation	experienced	a	significant	offset	for	both	the	Southern	and	the	Northern	Member	States	after	the	debut	of	the	Maastricht	criteria	in	1997.	Surprisingly,	this	also	coincides	with	the	onset	of	the	increases	in	current	account	imbalances	within	the	EMU.	Between	1999	and	2008,	Germany	was	one	of	the	only	EA	members	with	a	falling	real	exchange	rate.	During	the	same	period,	the	average	competitiveness	in	the	periphery	diminished	by	an	annual	1.8	percentage	points	whilst	in	the	core	it	remained	quite	stagnant.	Significant	adjustments	arose	during	the	sovereign	debt	crises,	which	helped	to	reduce	the	macroeconomic	imbalances.	This	improvement	is	clearly	visible	in	the	negative	relationship	between	the	changes	in	REER	and	CA	balances	from	the	pre-crisis	and	post-crisis	period	(see	Table	2,	Appendix	C).	It	should	also	be	noted	that	the	core	countries	devalued	their	REER,	through	steadily	improving	their	unit	labour	costs,	whilst	the	peripheral	countries	fell	farther	behind.	Hence,	it	could	be	argued	that	an	adjustment	device	could	have	been	halted	by	the	introduction	of	a	common	currency.		4.6 Competitiveness			The	deterioration	of	competitiveness	is	also	apparent	from	the	declining	and	volatile	export	performance	(see	Appendix	B).	Also,	traditional	performance	indicators	demonstrate	a	significant	decline	in	competitiveness,	especially	amongst	the	PIIGS	nations,	since	the	adoption	of	the	euro.	For	example,	the	increases	in	unit	labour	costs	(ULC)	and	considerable	appreciation	of	REER	(see	section	4.5)	have	much	larger	in	comparison	to	other	euro	area	countries.	The	data	are	also	in	accordance	with	the	assumption	that	the	competitiveness	of	these	states	declined,	assisting	in	the	accumulation	of	government	debt	and	current	account	deficits	in	the	early	2000s.		In	order	to	gain	a	more	in	depth	understanding	on	the	competitiveness	within	a	euro	area,	the	Global	Competitiveness	Index	(GCI)	formulated	by	the	World	Economic	Forum	and	its	set	of	exhaustive	variables	will	be	investigated.	The	GCI	has	often	used	as	equipment	when	considering	the	macroeconomic	features	pivotal	for	growth	and	national	competitiveness.	It	consists	of	twelve	pillars8,	comprising	of	elements	such	as	the	condition	of	a	state’s	public	and	private	institutions,	the	state	of	communications	and	transportation	infrastructure	and	the	quality	of	education,	that	have	been	deemed	crucial	for	economic																																									 																					8	A	compressed	summary	has	been	provided	in	Appendix	D.	
	 	 	
	
25	growth.	Furthermore,	the	index	also	covers	labour,	development	and	the	effectiveness	of	financial	markets.		
Fig	6.	GCI	2006-2016	(World	Economic	Forum	Global	Competitiveness	Reports,	2006-2016)9.		Peripheral	countries	have	exhibited	both	large	amounts	of	CA	deficits	and	significantly	lower	competitiveness	levels	compared	to	the	core	nations.	After	the	outburst	of	the	financial	crisis,	there	has	been	as	significant	reversal	in	current	account	deficits10,	however	price	and	cost	competitiveness	have	experienced	only	slight	adjustments.	This	creates	some	uncertainty	concerning	the	endurance	of	convergence	when	it	comes	to	external	balances	and	implying	that	rebalancing	may	be	partially	justified	by	cyclical	factors,	i.e.	input	from	imports.		The	EU	has	also	begun	to	produce	harmonised	competitiveness	indicators	(HCI)	to	provide	a	consistent	measure	of	the	price	competitiveness	of	euro	area	member	states	(ECB,	2007).		Furthermore,	the	HCI	is	comparable	with	the	REER	of	the	euro	and	several	other	competitiveness	indices.	The	divergence	in	HCI	progressions	could	be	a	result	of	“different	price	developments	and	…	foreign	trade	specialisations”	(ECB,	2007).	Empirical	evidence11	illustrates	how	tenacious	inflation	features	across	different	Member	States																																									 																					9	Unfortunately	due	to	lack	of	documentation	in	this	stage,	the	GCI	range	is	begins	only	from	2006.		10	With	the	exception	of	Ireland	and	Spain.	11	HCI	table	1999-2006	available	in	Appendix	C.		
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	 26	have	had	a	substantial	effect	on	the	heterogeneity	of	HCI	advancements.	The	states	that	seemed	to	have	significant	improvements	in	price	competitiveness	since	the	introduction	of	the	euro	also	reported	the	smallest	inflation	rates.	On	the	contrary,	the	recorded	inflation	levels	of	the	PIIGS	largely	exceeded	the	euro	area	average.	Nonetheless,	some	divergence	may	actually	be	substantiated	as	far	as	it	reflects	a	“longer-term	catching-up	
process”	or	price	readjustments	regarding	asymmetric	shocks	(ECB,	2007).																															
	 	 	
	
27	
5 Conclusion		The	first	decade	of	the	European	Monetary	Union	has	been	associated	with	converge	in	unemployment	rates	across	the	Eurozone,	a	trend	that	was	disrupted	and	diverted	by	the	financial	crisis.	Empirical	evidence	and	the	data	collected	suggest	that	macroeconomic	imbalances	in	the	Eurozone	are	not	a	new	phenomena,	but	instead	an	on-going	cycle	that	has	developed	over	time.	
	Despite	the	outstanding	disparities	of	unemployment	in	the	Eurozone	during	the	latest	recession	period,	EMU	has	not	forestalled	the	progression	of	these	imbalances.		The	absence	of	country-specific	fiscal	or	monetary	policies	and	the	lack	of	risk-sharing	mechanisms	may	have	facilitated	some	of	the	great	deviation	in	unemployment	performances.	Furthermore,	the	evidence	suggests	a	significant	convergence	of	inflation	rates	amongst	Member	States.	But	as	with	unemployment,	the	data	implies	that	EMU	itself	has	not	been	the	main	contributor	towards	that	convergence.	One	of	the	reasons	for	this	is	that	the	event	of	inflation	convergence	was	put	in	motion	long	before	the	EMU	was	established,	and	the	phenomenon	has	not	been	limited	to	euro	area	members.	Overall,	the	presence	of	the	monetary	union	seems	to	have	had	little	effect	on	the	stability	or	acceleration	of	convergence	in	Europe.	The	first	hypothesis	that	was	tested	suggested	that	the	disparities	between	the	PIIGS	and	the	core	nations	were	facilitated	by	the	introduction	of	the	euro.	On	the	contrary	to	the	hypothesis,	empirical	evidence	shows	that	the	divergence	was	not	entirely	a	direct	ramification	of	implementing	a	common	currency.			Empirical	data	shows	that	competitiveness	in	the	Southern	countries	is	significantly	lower	than	in	their	Northern	counterparts.	Similar	progress	was	also	visible	in	the	inflation	rates.	Although	the	PIIGS	generally	had	significantly	larger	current	account	deficits	than	the	EZ	average,	it	does	not	make	them	entirely	responsible	for	the	divergence.	In	the	peripheral	countries	with	closed	capital	accounts	to	protect	their	weaker	currencies	and	large	segments	of	the	population	that	were	credit-constrained	pre-EMU.	After	the	capital	liberalisation	credit	became	readily	available	and	caused	these	states	to	experience	severe	indebtedness.	Tight	external	regulations	were	followed	by	strict	credit	market	restrictions,	limiting	the	capacity	for	domestic	credit	extensions.	Furthermore,	the	periphery	generally	had	larger	financial	exposure	and	more	relaxed	credit	market	regulation	than	the	core	countries.	These	traits	are	due	to	the	differences	in	currency	regimes:	the	core	economies	could	remain	open	as	a	result	of	hard	currencies	whilst	simultaneously	exonerating	them	from	doing	macroeconomic	adjustments	by	using	their	
	 28	domestic	credit	policies.	Furthermore,	the	overvaluation	of	the	real	effective	exchange	rates	caused	damage	in	export-oriented	countries,	helped	in	the	creation	of	a	housing	bubble	and	large	deficits	in	the	current	accounts.	Nonetheless,	many	of	the	factors	that	contributed	to	the	imbalances	have	now	either	significantly	diluted	or	completely	vanished.	This	could	suggest	that	the	reverse	adjustments	that	were	observed	during	and	after	the	sovereign	debt	crisis	are	to	remain	in	the	near	future.	This	suggests	that	the	our	secondary	hypothesis	on	the	irresponsibility	of	the	PIIGS	nations	was	only	partially	correct:	some	of	the	imbalance	were	a	direct	result	of	the	behaviour	of	these	countries,	however,	these	only	amalgamated	on	top	of	the	pre-existing	discrepancies.		Despite	the	ideal	scenario	of	a	fully	integrated	European	economy	being	still	quite	unrealistic	and	unachievable	in	the	upcoming	year	that	does	not	mean	that	all	hope	is	lost.	The	continent	continues	to	be	very	economically	interdependent,	however,	the	growing	gap	between	nations	could	cause	permanent	damages	unless	addressed.		It	should	be	acknowledged	that	due	to	the	partial	data	sets	(as	complete	data	covering	the	entire	time	period	was	unavailable	or	inaccessible	with	some	variables)	some	of	the	analysis	with	these	variables	has	been	fragmentary.	If	this	research	were	to	be	replicated,	it	would	be	advisable	to	confirm	the	access	to	relevant	data	sources	beforehand.	Also,	a	focus	on	one	hypothesis	instead	of	two	would	have	provided	a	clearer	foundation	for	the	research.															
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Appendix	A:	EMU	Timeline	
1970  The Werner Report, named after Luxembourg’s then Prime Minister and Finance 
Minister, sets out a three-stage approach to EMU – which is shelved because of 
difficult economic conditions in the early 1970s.  
1978  The European Monetary System is launched, consisting of an Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) and the European currency unit (ECU).  
1989  The Delors Report (named after the then Commission President Jacques Delors) 
maps out the road to EMU in three stages.  
1990  Launch of the first stage of EMU: closer economic policy coordination and the 
liberalisation of capital movements.  
1992  Signature of the Maastricht Treaty setting out the timetable for Economic and 
Monetary Union and the convergence criteria that Member States will be 
required to meet to participate in EMU.  
1994  Start of the second stage of EMU: creation of the European Monetary Institute 
(EMI). Member States are required to work to fulfil the five convergence criteria 
on inflation, interest rates, government deficit and debt, and exchange rate 
stability. 
1995  Madrid EU summit: The single currency is named ‘the euro’, and the scenario for 
the third stage of EMU – the introduction of the euro – is set out, with a three 
year transition period between the introduction of the new currency and the 
launch of euro cash.  
1997  The Stability and Growth Pact is agreed at the Amsterdam EU summit, to ensure 
that Member States maintain budgetary discipline in EMU. The European 
Council also agrees on the revised exchange rate mechanism (ERM II), which 
links the euro and currencies of non-participating Member States.  
May 1998  The European Council agrees to launch the third stage of EMU on 1 January 
1999 and that 11 of the 15 Member States meet the criteria to adopt the single 
currency. They are: Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland. It establishes the 
European Central Bank, which replaces the EMI as of 1 June 1998.  
June 1998  The European Central Bank starts operating with a mandate to decide and 
conduct monetary policy for the euro area. The primary objective of the ECB is 
to maintain price stability 31 December 1998. The exchange rates between the 
	 2	
euro and the currencies of the Member States that will adopt the euro are 
irrevocably fixed as from 1 January 1999. 
Jan 1999  Start of the third stage of EMU: the euro is launched as the single currency for 
11 Member States. However, the euro only exists as a virtual currency.  
Jan 2001  Following compliance with the Maastricht criteria, Greece becomes the 12th 
country to join the euro area.  
Jan 2002  Euro banknotes and coins are introduced in the 12 euro-area Member States.  
Jan 2007  Slovenia becomes the 13th member of the euro area in 2007.  
Jan 2008 Cyprus and Malta bring the number of euro-area members to 15.  
Jan 2009 The euro celebrates its first 10 years, and welcomes its 16th member - Slovakia. 
Jan	2010	 EU	condemns	major	irregularities	in	Greece’s	accounts,	their	deficit	being	12.7	per	cent,	which	is	over	four	times	the	maximum	limit.	
May	2010	 Member	States	agree	on	a	€	110	bn	bailout	package	for	Greece.			
Jan	2011	 Estonia	joins	the	euro.	Eurozone	and	IMF	approve	bailout	for	Portugal,	whilst	second	bailout	for	Greece	is	agreed	upon.	
Aug	2011	 European	Commission	warns	that	the	debt	crisis	might	spread	from	the	periphery	to	other	countries.	
Jan	2012	 S&P	downgrades	the	credit	rating	for	eight	EZ	countries	including	France	and	Finland.	Greece	“fiscal	pact”	is	agreed	upon.		
Feb	2012	 Greek	austerity	bill	passes;	Eurozone	service	sector	faces	recession.	
Jun	2012	 After	the	general	election	in	Greece,	fears	of	the	country	exiting	the	EZ	causes	unease	amongst	other	allying	states.														
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Appendix	B:	Data	Charts		
(IMF	World	Economic	Outlook	Database,	2017)
	(IMF	World	Economic	Outlook	Database,	2017)	
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	(IMF	World	Economic	Outlook	Database,	2017)		
	(Statistical	Data	Warehouse,	2017)	
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	(Euro	area	statistics,	2017)	
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Appendix	C:	Data	Tables	
	Table	1.	Current	Account	Determinants	(Estrada,	Galí	and	López-Salido,	2013).			 REER	(%	pa)	 CA	balance	(as	%	of	GDP)	
1999	-	2008	 2009	-	2016	 Change	 1999	-	2008	 2009	-	2016	 Change	
Finland	 0.26	 0.58	 0.32	 5.49	 -0.57	 -6.05	
France	 0.51	 -0.57	 -1.09	 0.47	 -1.87	 -2.34	
Germany	 -1.35	 0.47	 1.82	 2.80	 6.94	 4.14	
Greece	 1.44	 -1.95	 -3.39	 -10.98	 -5.79	 5.19	
Ireland	 3.26	 -3.57	 -6.83	 -2.52	 1.78	 4.30	
Italy	 1.36	 -0.27	 -0.27	 -0.80	 -0.14	 0.66	
Netherlands	 0.90	 -1.03	 -1.03	 5.99	 7.75	 1.77	
Portugal	 0.89	 -1.44	 -2.33	 -9.85	 -3.52	 6.33	
Spain	 1.95	 -2.05	 -4.01	 -6.01	 -1.17	 4.84	Table	2.	Macroeconomic	imbalances	in	the	Euro	area	(IMF	World	Economic	Outlook	Database,	2017).		
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	(ECB,	2007)			
	(Marelli	and	Signorelli,	2015)											
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Appendix	D:	Global	Competitiveness	Index	Pillars	
(Global	Competitiveness	Report,	2014)	
	
